A Modified al-Farabian Interpretation of Arisotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Nothing in Aristotelian texts seems to vex readers more than Aristotle’s position on what the happy life is. Does it consist in a life of all of the virtues, or is it to be found in a life of pure contemplation? The problem arises out of the fact that Aristotle himself seems to suggest both of these views at different points in his Nicomachean Ethics. Contemporary scholarship has split into two broad interpretations: inclusivism and intellectualism, with many varieties in between the two extremes. Simply put, inclusivists claim that practical and theoretical virtues are both needed for the ethical life, while intellectualists argue that, although moral virtues are good, it is the life of contemplation wherein true happiness lies. Again, the dilemma is that Aristotle himself seems to support both of these views.

The main difficulty, as I see it, lies in reconciling Aristotle’s claim that the life of contemplation is the happiest with the overwhelming amount of text he devotes to the practical virtues. An adequate solution to this particular difficulty has not been given in contemporary scholarship. I propose that for a possible solution we might look to some interpreters of Aristotle outside of the current intellectualist/inclusivist debate, to the medieval Aristotelians. Specifically, I would like to look at al-Farabi’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics.¹

Al-Farabi² suggested that there are different types of happiness, corresponding to different types of people. The theoretical life, possible through an illumination of the human intellect, combined with the necessary moral virtues, is the happiest life; but it is not possible for all humans, which makes the practical life the happiest for the vast majority of people. It is important to note immediately that al-Farabi’s interpretation is not perfect, nor is it meant to be a perfect interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics. Still, an examination of Aristotle’s ethics through al-Farabi’s project will enrich our understanding of Aristotle’s overall ethical system. Therefore it will be my goal in this essay to show that a modified al-Farabian interpretation is a helpful interpretation of Aristotle’s own texts, and an interesting way of reconciling the practical and theoretical life. In order to do this, I will first examine the dilemma found in Aristotle’s texts. Then I will highlight some of the current interpretations in scholarship, their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, I will explore al-Farabi’s interpretation, in order to develop Aristotle’s ethics and link it to his Politics in a new way.

The Aristotelian Dilemma

In order to set up the dilemma, I shall sketch the important points in Aristotelian ethical theory. As the notion of telos³ is central to the whole of Aristotle’s philosophical thought, it is certainly central to his ethics. All things in nature function towards some end⁴ and are defined accordingly by the end toward which they strive. Thus, virtue is defined in terms of function: “the virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work” (Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a17).⁵ If a being is functioning properly (that is, working toward its proper end) then it is virtuous. In order to determine what human virtue is, it is necessary to determine what the end of humanity is.

According to Aristotle, that which makes humans unique is rationality, and thus to be a properly functioning human, one must be rational.⁶ The end of humanity – that toward which all humans aim – is happiness. The human good is “an activity of the soul in accordance with a rational principle that is the best and most complete” (I.7.1098a17-18). Although happiness has been identified with many things⁷, according to Aristotle it is most properly “activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue” (I.13.1102a5). What precisely is involved in attaining this happiness remains to be clarified, in Aristotle’s own thought, as well as in the thought of later interpreters.

There are, for Aristotle, two main types of virtue: moral and intellectual. Moral virtues are not natural, but learned and perfected through habituation. Virtue is achieved by avoiding excess and defect: by preserving the mean between two extremes. Moral virtue as defined by Aristotle is a state of character concerned with choice of the mean (II.6.1106b35-1107a1), and is learned by imitating the morally upright in the community. Moreover, the morally virtuous individual must not only perform the correct actions, but also must have the correct intentions (II.4.1105a28-1105b12). Even here, rational capabilities are necessary. In order to learn the correct actions and choose between right and wrong, a rational soul is essential.

To be morally virtuous, we need phronesis (practical wisdom), but this is not the only intellectual virtue. Intellectual virtue manifests itself in several ways: scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, intuitive reason, and philosophical wisdom. Scientific knowledge is concerned with judgment of the universal and necessary (eternal) and has the capacity to demonstrate (VI.3.1139b20-35, VI.6.1140b32). Practical wisdom is a reasoned capacity to work toward human ends in life (VI.5.1140b20). A corollary of this is political wisdom – the practical wisdom concerned with the particulars of the city (VI.8.1141b20-30). Intuitive reason is that which grasps the first principles from which scientific knowledge proceeds (VI.6.1141a5-7). Philosophical wisdom is the “most finished” form of knowledge – it is the combination of intuitive reason and scientific knowledge (VI.7.1141a16-20).

We can assume, then, that the two main intellectual virtues are practical wisdom and philosophical wisdom, and are necessarily connected to each other. In fact, Aristotle writes that philosophical wisdom is the cause of happiness, and practical wisdom ensures the means to that happiness (VI.12.1144a3-10).⁸ He is clear that practical wisdom is subordinate to philosophical wisdom, since it is concerned with human things (VI.7.1141b8-9). Still, the moral virtues are necessary for practical wisdom, which is necessary for philosophical wisdom. Both intellectual and moral virtues are involved in the happy life. I will explore their precise correlation later; here I will note that they are both necessary for the following reason: since man is political, moral virtues are necessary for happiness in the political spectrum. In order to attain the knowledge of these virtues, practical wisdom is necessary. And properly speaking, in order to achieve the ideal environment for contemplation, practical wisdom is necessary (VI.13.1144b30).⁹

The apparent problem, however, arises in Book X of the NE. While Aristotle claims in Book VI that philosophical wisdom is the highest knowledge, he appears¹⁰ to include moral virtues in the happy life as well. In Book X Aristotle draws some conclusions from his previous enquiries. Since reason is what separates us from the animals, reason makes us who we are. Only when we are acting as rational animals can we fulfill our function and be happy. This leads Aristotle to claim in X.7 that happiness is, in the most proper sense, contemplation. The question that remains, then, is how to reconcile these seemingly disparate views. Why, if the contemplative life is the best, did Aristotle spend the first nine books of his NE on the practical life?

Interpretations in Current Scholarship

As previously mentioned, there are two broad camps into which current interpretations of Aristotle’s happy life can be grouped: inclusivism and intellectualism. But it may be more helpful to divide the interpreters by means of those who find Aristotle’s ethical works consistent, and those who find Aristotle to be inconsistent. Within each of these classifications, there is a further distinction between the intellectualists and the inclusivists.

Inclusivists claim that the earlier books of the NE reflect Aristotle’s view: that is, the happy life necessarily includes both the practical and the intellectual virtues. Moral character and phronesis (practical wisdom), combined with Sophia (philosophic wisdom) leads to eudaimonia (happiness). Inclusivists draw the conclusion that the happy life, for Aristotle, must include the practical and theoretical life. It is argued, for example, that Aristotle generally expounds an “‘inclusive’ doctrine of eudaimonia”¹¹: happiness requires both the moral and intellectual life. The flourishing life for humans necessarily involves the help of others; hence John Cooper writes that “friendship is an essential constituent of human flourishing.”¹² Some, such as T.H. Irwin, would go so far as to say that “Aristotelian virtues are the dominant component of happiness.”¹³

This is an appealing view for several reasons. Aristotle claims that happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (I.13.1102a5), and virtue is of two kinds: moral and intellectual (I.13.1103a5). Consequently, it has the advantage of including both the moral and intellectual in the happy life. Further, it takes Aristotle seriously when he says that the practical and the theoretical lives are connected. The philosophical sort of wisdom cannot be attained without the practical, specifically in terms of political purposes (X.8.1178b6).¹⁴ However, it falls short in one main aspect: it fails to account for Aristotle in Book X; in fact, inclusivism seems to ignore Book X. NE X.6-8 claims strongly that happiness is contemplation; this must be taken into account.

On the other end of the spectrum are the intellectualists, who argue that the whole of the NE should be read through the lens of Book X.6-8. Thus, while the moral virtues are good, it is contemplation that leads to the true happy life. It is contemplation which focuses on the eternal, the universal, and that which is god-like. As Aristotle writes, “the philosopher will more than any other be happy” (X.8.1179a30). This leads intellectualists, such as Richard Kraut, to argue that “perfect happiness consists in just one good – theoria (contemplation), the actualization of theoretical wisdom.”¹⁵ The other virtues and goods are desirable only as means to happiness, but are not ‘components’ of happiness. ¹⁶ Some, such as the pre-inclusivist Cooper, claim that moral virtue plays virtually no role whatsoever in the ideal – intellectual – life.¹⁷

This interpretation has the advantage of taking seriously Aristotle’s very straightforward claim in Book X that the life of contemplation is the happiest life. It is consistent with Aristotle’s claim that the rational faculty is that which leads to human flourishing. Moreover, Aristotle implies at the start of X.6 that he has not yet drawn any conclusions about happiness – so it could be argued quite easily that Books I-IX were incomplete attempts to understand happiness. This being said, Book X is not the only book in the NE. Thus, although intellectualism is consistent with Book X, it fails to reconcile itself coherently with the earlier books. Why, if happiness is solely contemplation, did Aristotle spend so much time discussing the practical life? It seems absurd that Aristotle would spend so much time on moral virtue if it were unnecessary, or even secondary, to the happy life.

This leads some interpreters to claim that Aristotle was inconsistent in his overall argumentation. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, argues that NE X.6-8 does not fit with the rest of Aristotle’s ethics, and is in outright contradiction with much of the argumentation in the NE.¹⁸ She gives several examples of this contradiction. In this and other ethical works, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is made up of several parts, including virtues and contemplation; in X.6-8, he says that it is single: theoria. Elsewhere in the NE, Aristotle claims that the excellences of character are for their own sake, not just for the sake of contemplation. Furthermore, while Book X identifies us with the theoretical intellect, Book IX (1166a16-17) identifies us with practical reason. These examples, as well as some others, lead Nussbaum (and Ackrill as well) to claim that Aristotle is simply inconsistent. Nussbaum argues, further, that for Aristotle, it is incoherent to strive for the divine because “this involves wishing for a life that cannot be lived by a being of the same sort as we are […]”¹⁹ Thus she sides with the inclusivists, believing that the bulk of Aristotelian texts support eudaimonia as being made up of virtue and contemplation.

While it is tempting to take this line of argument in light of the apparent difficulties in the text, this must be a last resort and is one that is unfair to Aristotle. For Aristotle says himself in X.6 that, while he has discussed friendship, virtues and pleasures, he has not yet defined the nature of happiness (1176a30). The implication is clear here: Aristotle is aware of his arguments in the previous nine books, and that he has not yet reached anything conclusive. This is not inconsistency; rather, Aristotle is acknowledging that he has given some unsuccessful or incomplete accounts of happiness. Furthermore, in the next chapter, when Aristotle says that happiness is contemplation, he claims that it is in accord with his earlier claims (1177a18-19). Again, Aristotle’s works indicate his inclination to think he is being consistent.

Instead of claiming that Aristotle is simply inconsistent, I believe it is more productive to see Aristotle as a mean between the intellectualist and inclusivist extremes. There are other varieties of intellectualism, less strict than Kraut, and more helpful. One such interpreter is David Keyt, who advocates a moderate intellectualist position he calls the superstructure view. Briefly stated, this is the view that the value of the moral life is incommensurable with the value of theoretical activity, but that theory is not absolutely prior. Thus,

the moral life sets certain minimum requirements that must be satisfied before one is to engage in theoretical activity; but the view does not demand that one should never shirk a duty, however trivial, for an opportunity to contemplate.²⁰

I would like to keep this particular interpretation in mind as we begin to look at al-Farabi.

Al-Farabi’s Interpretation

Contemporary scholars have formulated very nuanced and subtle ways of handling this issue. However, rather than poring through more of these possibilities, in an attempt to advocate one, I suggest that we establish if al-Farabi’s interpretation will give us insight into Aristotle. I believe it will provide a possible solution to why Aristotle spent so much time investigating the practical life, while still claiming that the theoretical life is the happiest. What it will not do is provide a flawless interpretation of the NE. Unfortunately, al-Farabi’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is not extant; although he may have had a flawless interpretation of Aristotle’s NE, we do not have access to it anymore.²¹ Instead, we have texts that are part of al-Farabi’s project to reconcile Platonic and Aristotelian thought. Thus, he no doubt Platonized Aristotle’s ethical thought, merging Plato’s “Republic” with Aristotle’s “Polis”, and we must take this into account as we read al-Farabi. Nevertheless, while al-Farabi falls short of a ‘perfect’ account of Aristotle, he still provides a coherent and interesting interpretation. My hope is that through a critical examination of al-Farabi’s texts, alongside Aristotle’s NE and Politics, we will arrive at a plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics.

Al-Farabi, in The Perfect State, explains the ideals for the happy life. For al-Farabi, there are two broad types of happiness: theoretical and political. Theoretical happiness has to do with the actualization of the intellect. Al-Farabi, drawing from Aristotle’s De Anima, explains that, through a sort of illumination, the Active Intellect provides light to the material intellect, to actualise its potential for receiving intelligibles:

The other things which are in matter or are matter or have matter are neither actually nor potentially intellects. They are, however, potentially intelligible and can possibly become intelligible, but their substances lack the wherewithal to be actually intelligized of their own accord… To become better in actuality, it (the rational faculty in man) needs something else which transfers it from potentiality to actuality, and it becomes actually intellect only when intelligibles arise in it.²²

This reception of the first intelligibles is made possible by the Active Intellect, and leads to unity with the Active Intellect, and through this, the illumination and perfection of the soul.²³ Al-Farabi writes that the “most perfect rank of humanity, the highest degree of felicity when the soul is united with the Active Intellect.”²⁴ Accordingly, the life of contemplation provides the highest sort of happiness. For al-Farabi, political thought is secondary, and serves theoretical happiness. He echoed Aristotle’s comments on the importance of friends:

Therefore, to achieve what he can of that perfection, every man needs to stay in neighborhood of others and associate with them… which is why he is called the social and political animal.²⁵

Since other people are necessary for the achievement of happiness,²⁶ the ideal polis must be in place for true happiness to exist. Furthermore, political philosophy, in al-Farabi’s thought, has two aspects: first, bringing about understanding of what happiness is and distinguishing virtue from non-virtue; second, ordering the virtuous states of character.²⁷ Here, al-Farabi echoes Aristotle’s claim in NE I.2 that the science of the good for man is politics. In order to be a good ruler, the philosopher must be virtuous as well. Thus al-Farabi explains

Set down two men, one of whom already knows what is in all of Aristotle’s books pertaining to physics, logic, metaphysics, politics, and mathematics, and all or the bulk of whose actions are in conflict with what is noble according to the unexamined opinion shared by everyone. All of the actions of the other are in agreement with what is noble according to the unexamined opinion shared by everyone, even though he is not knowledgeable about the sciences the first one knows. Now this second one is closer to being a philosopher than the first… And he is more able to master what the first has already mastered than the first to master what the second has already mastered. Philosophy, in truth… is for a human being to attain the theoretical sciences and to have all of his actions be in agreement with what is noble according to shared unexamined opinion and in truth.²⁸

It is not possible, at least in human life,²⁹ to be theoretically happy without being practically virtuous. The ideal ruler will, therefore, have a combination of the contemplative and morally virtuous life, seemingly one in accord with or similar to Keyt’s suggested method.³⁰

Still, al-Farabi has some more to add where contemporary discussions stop: to explain why Aristotle spends so much time on the moral life. He captures this Aristotelian juxtaposition of the two senses of happiness, and offers a reconciliation of the two: two types of people. Man’s perfection and happiness is according to his rank.³¹ The philosopher/ruler will be happy in the most proper sense, for only he has access to the first intelligibles, through unity with the Active Intellect. Thus the happiest life of contemplation is only possible for certain persons.³² And if the city’s ruler is virtuous, its individual members will be happy. ³³ There must be unity in the city,

that brings together their opinion, beliefs, and actions; that renders their divisions harmonious, linked together, and well ordered; and at that point they will support one another in their actions and assist one another to reach the purpose that is sought after, namely, ultimate happiness.³⁴

Thus a secondary sort of happiness is available to the masses, which results from a sort of Platonic harmony of the whole, communicated to the masses through religion.³⁵ And this explains why Aristotle spent so much time on the moral life: the second group, which relies on moral virtue, is the largest. Consequently, this major interpretive difficulty seems to be solved through al-Farabi’s interpretation.

This interpretation, while rather elitist and politically incorrect, is an interesting reading of Aristotle. Especially when we read Aristotle’s NE alongside his Politics,³⁶ al-Farabi’s interpretation provides a plausible schema for happiness in the polis. Aristotle, through the commentary of al-Farabi, could be understood to be claiming the following. First, broadly speaking from the distinction made in the NE:

(1) The happiest life is the contemplative life, which consists in the union of the Material intellect with the Active intellect, as well as the virtues necessary for existing in a human environment.³⁷

(2) A secondary sort of happy life is available to the masses in the city, which results from the ruler’s union with the Active Intellect, individual virtue, and the virtue of the city as a whole.³⁸

But secondly, and more technically, it could be broken down into four as follows:

(1) The happiest life is the contemplative life alone, but this is not possible in a human context – it is divine.³⁹

(2) The happiest human life is the contemplative life, as well as the virtues necessary for existing in a human environment. This is Keyt’s superstructure view, and is possible only for the philosopher ruler.⁴⁰

(3) The second happiest human life is gained by the followers of the philosophers, who understand the natures of things as demonstrated by the philosophers. These are, arguably, the gentlemen of the community. These individuals live the life of moral virtue and practical reason.⁴¹

(4) A tertiary happy life is found in the rest of the citizens; described in al-Farabi as the masses, in Aristotle as slaves, women, and children. These individuals are happy in so far as they are in a properly functioning polis and are virtuous in whatever way is proper to them.⁴²

I think this is a helpful interpretation of Aristotle, and roughly equivalent to Aristotle’s hierarchy, save a few discrepancies. First, al-Farabi claims that in an after-life, the contemplative life alone is achieved;⁴³ Aristotle would certainly not argue this point.⁴⁴ Second, al-Farabi believes that in the ideal city, the philosopher and the legislator will be the same;⁴⁵ Aristotle has the two distinct.⁴⁶ Third, Aristotle’s gentlemen do not merely follow the philosophers; rather, they share in practical reason and moral virtue. Finally, Aristotle makes a clear distinction among the masses (freemen vs. slaves, women, children), whereas al-Farabi only implies it.⁴⁷ These, however, are resolvable issues if we use al-Farabi’s schema as a guideline to Aristotle.

Aristotle, in the NE, clearly claims that there is a primary and a secondary sense of happiness⁴⁸: the primary sense of happiness is contemplation (X.8.1178b8), and the secondary sense of happiness is “life in accordance with other types of virtue” (X.8.1178a8), resulting from the happiness of the rulers. Even in the life of contemplation, moral virtues are necessary, since man is not entirely divine. Aristotle adds several more to these two psychological/social levels in his Politics. Socrates was wrong in asserting that the virtues of men and women are the same, Aristotle claims; rather, virtue varies from individual to individual.⁴⁹ The slave needs only as much virtue as is necessary to perform his duties, likewise with a woman or child.⁵⁰ Thus, these “classes” of individuals have a tertiary sort of happiness, in accordance with their virtue. They have no share in happiness proper, since they lack some of the deliberative faculty of the higher classes.⁵¹ It seems that Aristotle would divide the polis in the following manner:

(1) contemplative life (with necessary moral virtues): philosophers⁵²

(2) practical wisdom and moral virtues: legislators and gentlemen⁵³

(3) tertiary virtuous life: slaves, women, children⁵⁴

In this system, the virtue of each level would contribute to the overall happiness of the whole.⁵⁵

Thus, I suggest a revised reading of al-Farabi as a “new” interpretation of Aristotle’s happy life. The contemplative life is the happiest life, according to the course Aristotle sets out in De Anima. In order for the contemplative individual to live a human life,⁵⁶ however, he must be morally virtuous as well. This happiest life is only possible for philosophers. The statesmen must strive for a secondary sort of happiness, through practical wisdom and moral virtue. And women, children, and slaves strive for a tertiary happiness, through whatever virtue they are meant to achieve. Thus, Aristotle is able to maintain consistency in his statement that happiness is ‘activity in accordance with virtue [function]’. It is consistent because philosophers, citizens, and others each have different functions. Their happiness is dependent on each flourishing in their intended way. And it would seem, as al-Farabi suggested, that the flourishing polis will depend upon each part of society functioning in its proper way.

Conclusions

Aristotle himself was ambiguous enough in his ethical writings to allow for the dozens of interpretations that currently exist. He is not sufficiently clear as to how the contemplative and practical lives should be connected. However, it is clear that al-Farabi’s views clarify Aristotle’s in a way that has heretofore been ignored. It is my hope that, bringing forward al-Farabi’s views on the happy life, I will have brought some clarity to the issue. While it is by no means complete, I hope it will act as a starting point for further discussion.

It may initially seem as if al-Farabi is too Platonic in his notion of the polis. This is true, since his Attainment of Happiness is the first book in a series on the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle. But the hierarchy formulated in al-Farabi’s thought can be found in Aristotle’s NE as well as his Politics; Aristotle has Platonic tendencies: the structure of his polis was no doubt influenced by Plato’s Republic.⁵⁷ More importantly, the hierarchy as explained by al-Farabi provides an interesting solution to the longstanding debate between intellectualists and inclusivists. Aristotle devotes nine books on the practical life and claims that the theoretical life is the happiest, because so few are capable of the happiest life. This is no doubt an uncomfortable and politically incorrect solution to modern readers. Still, it is arguably Aristotle’s theory. Therefore, al-Farabi’s thought can be used to develop Aristotle’s ethics, as well as to link it to the Politics in a new way.

Carrie Peffley, U. of Cambridge

NOTES

1. Part of the inspiration for this essay came from a paper on Aristotle’s ethics in William Starr’s ethics course at Marquette University, as well as Dr. Scott’s recommendation that I examine Politics I.13.

2. Al-Farabi (ca.870-950) was born most likely in the province of Farab in Turkestan. He moved to Baghdad, where he spent most of his philosophical career; he died in Damascus. Little is known of his life outside of these few facts. For further information see D.Black’s “al-Farabi” in History of Islamic Philosophy eds. Nasr and Leaman; see also Ian Netton’s Al-Farabi and His School.

3. Defined as end or purpose.

4. Aristotle. Physics II.8.198b10. Trans. Hardie and Gaye. (All Aristotle references are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes.)

5. All citations from the Nicomachean Ethics(Trans. W.D. Ross) will be in text.

6. The capacity for rationality, exercised, is sufficient.

7. These include virtue, practical wisdom, philosophy, pleasure, prosperity, etc. See NE I.8., especially 1098b24-26 and 1099b8.

8. Moreover, practical wisdom is a necessary means to happiness. Aristotle comments, for example, in Movement of Animals, that a corresponding desire must be attached to reason in order for a being to act (7.701a5-30).

9. Aristotle adds that to suggest practical wisdom is supreme to philosophical wisdom is like suggesting that “the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of state” (NE VI.13.1145a10).

10. I say appears because Aristotle never claims this. He merely spends a large amount of time discussing the moral virtues.

11. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia” p.59. He is an inconsistent inclusivist, but his statement of inclusivism is helpful here.

12. Cooper “Friendship and the Good in Aristotle” p.293 in Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays.

13. Irwin “Permanent Happiness” p.27 in Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays.

14. It is not necessary in an instrumental sense, since Aristotle claims that moral virtues are for their own sake (see NE II.4.1105a33, X.6.1176b5-10).

15. Kraut, “Aristotle on the Human Good” p.86 in Aristotle’s Ethics.

16. Ibid. p.89.

17. See Cooper Reason and the Human Good.

18. Nussbaum. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy p.375.

19. Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, p.376.

20. Keyt, “Intellectualism in Aristotle” p.370. in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, eds Anton and Preus. Keyt also outlines several other moderate intellectualist positions.

21. Several references are made to his non-extant commentary in other medieval texts. Ibn-Bajja, for example, refers to al-Farabi’s commentary. See Pines, “Limitations of Human Knowledge according to al-Farabi, ibn-Bajja and Maimonides” pp.404-431 in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Twersky.

22. Al-Farabi. The Perfect State (PS). IV.13.1. Trans. Richard Walzer.

23. This perfection is possible only through separation from the material, as we shall see.

24. Al-Farabi. PS V.15.1.

25. Attainment of Happiness (AH) i.18. (Trans. Muhsin Mahdi: The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle Part I: The Attainment of Happiness) Italics are Mahdi’s, not al-Farabi’s.

26. PS V.15.1.

27. Book of Religion (BR). 15[59]. in Alfarabi: The Political Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts, Trans. Charles Butterworth. This is done through education.

28. Aphorism (98). in Alfarabi: The Political Writings.

29. Cf. NE X.8 1178b33.

30. And the philosopher will have a combination of the two, not just because it is necessary for the political context, but also because it is necessary for the fullest and best life (as al-Farabi argues above in Aphorism 98), through promoting complete unity with the Active Intellect.

31. AH iii.43. Cf. NE 1165a15, Politics VII.8.1328b1.

32. The majority of medieval Aristotelians (such as Averroes, ibn-Tufayl, ibn-Bajja, Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Braband) opt for this interpretation as well.

33. Cf. Politics VII.14.1333a15.

34. BR 27[66].

35. Al-Farabi makes a distinction between philosophy and religion: “Philosophy gives an account of the ultimate principles (that is, the essence of the first principle and the essences of the incorporeal second principles), as they are perceived by the intellect. Religion sets forth their images by means of similitudes of them taken from corporeal principles and imitates them by their likenesses among political offices.” AH iv.55.

36. This is Aristotle’s intention, since he explains in NE X.9 that what he has said in the NE necessitates his Politics.

37. Cf. Aristotle NE X.7,8, De Anima III.4,5; al-Farabi PS 13.5, Aphorism 98.

38. Cf. NE I.2, X.8, Politics I.13.1260a17, 1260b14, VII.14.1333a15; PS 15-17, Enumeration of the Sciences 5.3. (in Alfarabi: The Political Writings).

39. Cf. NE X.7.1177b26; PS V.16.3-4.

40. Cf. NE X.8.1179a30-33; AH iv.54.

41. Cf. NE X.8.1178a8-20; AH iii.38-41, 44,47.

42. Cf. Politics I.13.1260a20; AH iii.41,43,47.

43. PS V.16.3-4.

44. However, in his non-extant Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, al-Farabi seemingly acknowledged this. Ibn-Bajja explained: “As to what is believed about Abu Nasr [al-Farabi] regarding what he says in his Commentary on the Book of Ethics, namely that after death and demise there is no afterlife, that there is no happiness except political happiness, that there is not existence except that which is perceived by the senses and that that through which it is said another existence than the one which [has just been mentioned comes about] is nothing but an old wives’ tale […]” (as quoted by Pines, p.405).

45. AH iv.54, 57-58. He acknowledges, however, that this does not always occur, in which case there must be two leaders: a philosopher and a legislator (PS V.15.14).

46. Politics VII.2.1324a29.

47. AH iii.48.

48. He claimed as well that there are two degrees of friendship (VIII.3.1156a15-20), knowledge (VI.3.1139b17), and pleasures (X.5.1176a20-30).

49. Pol. I.13.1260a20-25.

50. Ibid. 1260a35.

51. For further, see Kraut’s chapter on slavery in his Aristotle: Political Philosophy, pp.277-305.

52. Cf. NE X.8.1178b33-1179a33. This is a hierarchy for human happiness. The life of the gods is happiest (1178b9,20-25). Again, it seems that a view like Keyt’s superstructure applies to the philosophers.

53. Cf. NE X.8.1178a.8-20, Pol. VII.2.1324a29. The moral virtues of this class may differ from the moral virtues of the philosophers, since the statesmen have virtues based upon their grand scale of living. The philosopher, therefore, may be generous, while the statesman will have magnificence.

54. It should be noted that Aristotle would distinguish between the types of virtue available to each class. Free women and slaves, for example, do not have the same virtues, and therefore, do not have the same happiness.

55. Pol. I.13.1260b10-15.

56. Since the human is a combination of divine and human qualities (NE X.8.1178a20).

57. These tendencies lead some, Nussbaum being a stellar example, to claim that NE X.6-8 should be discounted for its overtly Platonic musings, p.375.